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abstract
In an attempt to ensure all citizens are equally represented and their interests accommodated in a 
multicultural setting, Fiji changed its electoral system four times since flag independence. The first 
three electoral systems used in 1970, 1990 and 1999 were First Past the Post (FPTP), a system 
of ethnic based rolls and seats using FPTP, and Alternative Voting (AV) respectively. These were 
systems with communally assigned seats because of the country’s ethnic configuration. Leaders then 
justified their adoption as a way to facilitate fair representation of all citizens. The 2014 election 
was contested under a new electoral system of proportional representation and eliminated reserved 
ethnic seats. This paper critically examines the results of the 2014 elections under the new open list 
proportional representation system. It analyses the intentions of the electoral system under the 2013 
constitution and the extent to which its targets were achieved in the 2014 election results. The paper 
also highlights lessons from constitutional and electoral engineered systems in other Pacific island 
countries and compares these with Fiji’s new electoral and political party system. It concludes with 
possible future scenarios for the country under the current constitution and electoral system.    
Keywords: electoral system; proportional representation; electoral engineering; political stability; 
ethnic politics; political parties
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introduction
This paper discusses the process of electoral and political party engineering with a specific focus 
on the outcomes of the Fiji national elections under the 2014 electoral system. It is a system 
hailed by its designers as one that embraces all ethnicities where representation is captured in 
the catchphrase ‘Fiji for All Fijians’. The electoral system and political party arrangements 
were engineered through the provisions of the 2013 Constitution and the 2014 Electoral Decree 
ostensibly to rid the country of ethnic politics (i.e. ethnic based seats and political parties) and 
promote equal representation for all Fijians. The paper briefly revisits three previous electoral 
systems (1970, 1990 and 1999) before describing the current electoral system. The newly 
introduced electoral and political party system is discussed in detail and its first use in the 2014 
elections is commented on. More importantly, the results of the elections are critically analysed 
to ascertain the impacts of the new system. This would allow for brief comparisons with other 
Pacific island states that have also engineered their party and electoral systems. The article ends 
with a discussion of possible scenarios that could arise in the future as a result of this new 
electoral system. 
constitutional and ElEctoral EnginEEring 
Electoral engineering refers to the process of developing and implementing “… constitutional 
and legal provisions for electoral systems frameworks that are targeted at achieving specific 
societal goals” (Wall & Salih, 2007, p.6).  The desire to ensure equal representation of diverse 
groups and an opportunity to govern under politically stable environments where representatives 
articulate the interests of their constituents led to recent efforts in electoral and political party 
engineering in the Pacific. Good governance, accountability and fair representation of citizens 
in political decision making are usual considerations of constitutional and electoral engineering 
undertakings. Some political engineering was done through constitutions as was the case in Fiji 
and Kiribati. Others like Samoa and Papua New Guinea (PNG) have separate legislations aimed 
at similar outcomes for stable and orderly governments. Political parties in most Pacific island 
states are fluid and loosely organised at the extreme opposite of what Scott Mainwaring (1998) 
referred to as an ‘institutionalized continuum’. He argued that in ‘third wave’ countries (most 
PICs included), the political party systems are often fluid because of: (i) the recent political and 
socio-economic history operating as a nation state; (ii) the way political actors use its structure 
and respond to the way the state was established; and (iii) a consequence of a pervasive ‘anti-
organisational political culture’ (Mainwaring, 1999; Okole, 2005, p.366). The tendencies by 
politicians to avoid accountability to strong political parties weaken party systems. 
There are other explanations put forward, for example by Arend Lijphart (1999), as to why 
political parties emerge and are institutionalised. This is usually called the ‘sociological school’ 
view. He argued that party systems emerge as consequences of social cleavages and he identified 
seven distinct ‘issue dimensions’ as critical in shaping modern parties. These are: cleavages 
that arise from socio-economic dimension; religious dimension; cultural-ethnic dimension; 
urban-rural dimension;  the dimension of regime support; the foreign policy dimension; and the 
materialist versus  post-materialistic dimension (1999, p.79-86). Making reference to PNG’s 
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party system, Lijphart stated that socio-economic, cultural-ethnic, religious and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation was so great that it fails to serve as a viable basis for national-level party political 
mobilisation (see Okole, 2005). 
What happens in most PICs is that since electoral democracies were introduced by colonial 
governments, parliamentary groups emerged and are organised like political parties. Political 
parties are mostly fluid and voters may not necessarily vote for political party policies but 
individual candidates in these political parties. This may partly explain the government instability 
that is continuously being experienced in countries like the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Papua 
New Guinea. The obvious lack of institutionalised party systems that resulted in voters voting for 
individuals with no political affiliations prompted some PICs to engineer their electoral systems 
to strengthen political parties and encourage parliamentary stability. They often adopt systems 
that discipline floor crossing and votes of no confidence in parliament. Below is a brief overview 
of electoral and political parties’ engineering attempts in PNG and Samoa to enable us to compare 
the potential long term effect and sustainability of the Fiji electoral and political party system.
ElEctoral EnginEEring in saMoa
A good overview of the Samoan electoral system and its complexities since independence has 
been provided by So’o and Fraenkel (2005). Political engineering in Samoa took place around 
2005 when the electoral system was reviewed and amended. The Electoral Amendment Act 
2005 made some changes to the status of candidates and provisions on switching membership 
of parties with corresponding penalties.  Since that review, a candidate is required to remain 
affiliated to his/her political party after the election. In the event that an MP defects to another 
party after an election, he/she faces the consequence of being disqualified and a by-election is 
called (Sioa, 2010, p.198). If an MP wishes to quit his or her party, the only option available is to 
become an independent MP. Independent MPs are not allowed by law to form political parties. 
Independents are not allowed to switch to another party, nor allowed to hold a ministerial post 
in the ruling party. There is also a provision for political party registration. Political parties must 
be formed by election time in order to be legally recognized as official parties. The electoral 
commissioner keeps the register of all political parties. In the parliamentary Standing Orders, it 
is a requirement that before a political party is recognized in parliament, a party must secure a 
threshold of 8 MPs in the house (Sioa, 2010, p.198). These incremental legislative controls that 
discouraged the defections of MPs have ensured political stability in Samoa in that the Human 
Right Protection Party (HRPP) has ruled since 1982 (see So’o 2009). On the other hand, it gave 
rise to the establishment of a one party system in the country.
ElEctoral EnginEEring in papua nEw guinEa
Similar to Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea had been struggling with political 
stability and no confidence votes since independence (see Van Trease 2005; Nanau 2010). As 
Standish observed, “[t]he major concern has been political instability, which leads to policy flip-
flops and rotating elites ruthlessly exploiting the spoils of office” (2002, p.30). To address the 
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institutional weakness of PNG’s party system, a new law called the 2001 Organic Law on the 
Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC) was introduced under the leadership of 
PM Morauta (ibid).  His government wanted to address social and economic issues confronting 
the country but realised that political instability was the core obstacle. The fluid and fluctuating 
party system was seen as the major cause of this rampant instability and floor crossing. As such, 
the Morauta Government introduced the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and 
Candidates (OLIPPAC) with the following key provisions: (1) party registration; (2) funding of 
parties and candidates; (3) strengthening political parties in Parliament; and (4) incentives for 
female candidates. 
The primary intention of OLIPPAC was to strengthen the political party system using its 
provisions to outlaw MPs moving from party to party and associating with more than one party 
at a given time. A critical provision that should ensure stability is the binding of MPs to stick to 
the prime minister they voted for in the first place. If there is a vote of no confidence,  a vote on 
the national budget or a vote on constitutional changes, MPs on the government side cannot vote 
against their prime minister (Standish 2002, p.30).  For PNG, the noble intentions of OLIPPAC 
became problematic when implemented.  Indeed, its implementation almost invalidated relevant 
provisions of the legislation. Henry Okole (2012) for instance highlighted that parliamentary 
behaviour from late 2003 onwards appears to disregard the law. It can potentially allow an 
unethical or dangerous prime minister to be in office for five years. Standish (2002, p.30) 
also pointed out that under OLIPPAC, MPs can actually change their loyalties if they do so 
collectively as members of a political party - a loophole that was not foreseen. 
To support the OLIPPAC, the electoral system was also changed from First Past the Post (FPTP) 
to Limited Preferential Voting (LPV). The need for this change was due to the realisation that the 
electoral votes that parties obtained since 1977 have declined over time and most MPs secured 
seats with less than 20 percent of the votes (see Gelu, 2003; Standish, 2002; Okole, 2002). To 
avoid this, the LPV system encouraged broader based support for winning candidates. In other 
words, candidates had to campaign in a collective manner with candidates potentially gaining 
each other’s preferences (Standish, 2002).  The engineering of PNG’s electoral system is such 
that it complements the OLIPPAC. LPV and OLIPPAC cannot be effective in isolation and 
they are meant to bolster one another. Like Samoa, PNG is experimenting with its electoral 
system to determine an appropriate role and niche for political parties. Of course the outcomes 
of these attempts are mixed. They range from providing stable governments to that of potentially 
encouraging one party rule.  
FiJi: oldEr ElEctoral systEMs
Fiji’s previous constitutions, political party and electoral systems also faced similar challenges 
and concerns as those ‘addressed’ through engineering in Kiribati, Samoa and PNG. Political 
parties and elections prior to and after independence were usually based around issues of 
ethnicity, ancient iTaukei rivalries and class consciousness (Durutalo, 2010). The electoral 
system of the 1970 Constitution for instance was FPTP with ethnic constituency seats. Arguably, 
representation under that system followed the resemblance theory (Baradat, 2009) as MPs are 
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seen as representatives that resemble their constituents. Following the coups of 1987 two new 
constitutions were adopted in 1990 and 1997 respectively. The 1990 constitution provided for an 
electoral system that allocated specific numbers of seats to four separate rolls. Thirty-seven MPs 
were voted in by those registered under the Fijian roll; twenty-seven from the Indian roll; one MP 
from the Rotuman roll; and five MPs chosen by a roll of voters that were neither Fijian, Indian 
nor Rotuman (GOF 1990, p.62). The electoral system under the 1990 Constitution was FPTP. 
Under the 1997 Constitution a system of Alternative Vote (AV) was adopted. AV is a voting 
system in which electors vote preferentially and lower placed candidates drop out in succession 
with their vote being redistributed until one candidate gains 50 per cent (Section 54, Fiji 1997 
Constitution; see also Heywood, 2007, p.259). Representation under the 1997 constitution could 
be seen through the delegation model where a delegate acts as a conduit conveying the views of 
their constituents but may not exercise judgement or preferences because of the strength of the 
groups that they represent.  The constitution and electoral system were again partly ethnically 
constituted. The 2013 Constitution and the 2014 Elections and Political Parties decree engineered 
a new electoral and political party system. What follows is an assessment of these electoral 
provisions and an initial assessment of the 2014 democratic election results. It should be stressed 
that the full implications of this engineered system will become more apparent after the 2018 
election results.
thE ElEctoral and political party systEM in FiJi sincE 2013
As suggested earlier, the political history and experiences of Fiji since the colonial period 
produced a divided society that had been and continues to be the core of political discussions 
in the country. The reasonably stable political climate in the first 17 years of independence 
encountered a reality check in 1987 when the first coups opened the way for a succession of 
coups, the latest of which was conducted by Commodore Frank Bainimarama in 2006. 
Those who took power in the latest military takeover claimed it was “a coup that would end 
all coups” (see Fraenkel, Firth & Lal, 2009). The then interim regime that ruled for a further 
8 years took upon itself the arduous task of moving Fiji citizens towards the path of peaceful 
coexistence and constitutional equality. It also engineered an electoral and political party system 
to move away from ‘business as usual’. The 2013 constitution and electoral system aimed at 
producing a stable political environment that would then facilitate nation building and move 
away from the ethnic divisions that had dominated party formation and election campaigning 
since independence.
thE proportional rEprEsEntation systEM
Fiji’s current electoral system is a multi-member open list system of proportional representation. 
In a move to discourage ethnic, regional and class voting, the Fiji 2013 Constitution attempted 
to ensure that voters choose representatives that are mandated and trusted to make laws for 
them.   Under this electoral system, Fiji is a single constituency, meaning that the country is 
not divided into electoral constituencies or districts1. Each voter has one vote and the slogan 
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is ‘equal citizenry - one vote, equal value’ (see www.electionsfiji.gov.fj). What this entails is 
that each MP is representing the whole country and its citizens rather than certain electoral 
constituencies. There is also a provision in the 2013 constitution for a 5% threshold. A total of 
496,363 people voted in the 2014 elections. This is multiplied by 0.05, giving a total of 24,818 
as the 5% threshold required by each political party or independent candidate to secure a seat.  
table 1: Summary of votes polled and seats secured by the seven political parties
total Valid Votes % 496,363 seats
FijiFirst 59.20% 293,714 32
FLP 2.40% 11,670 0
NFP 5.50% 27,066 3
PDP 3.20% 15,864 0
SODELPA 28.20% 139,857 15
OneFiji 1.20% 5,839 0
FUFP 0.20% 1,072 0
Roshika Deo 0.20% 1,055 0
Umesh Chand 0.00% 226 0
Source: Fijian Elections Office, 2014
Figure 1: Percentages of votes polled by political parties
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As can be seen in Table 1, ‘the threshold is determined by votes across the board for political 
parties. For instance, if a party has two candidates: one receives three percent of the vote and 
the other receives two per cent of the vote. Combined, this is five percent and the party will be 
allocated one party seat’ (“Pacific Scoop”, 2014). The threshold of 5% in this case is very high 
and a lot of votes, 35,725 (7.2%) were wasted. If a party or independent candidate gets 4% of the 
votes, which is around 15496 votes, none of these will be taken into consideration. This brings 
into question the idea of equal representation under the current system. From Table 1 above, the 
votes secured by FLP and PDP were not considered as representing a seat or two. Representation 
would have been different had the threshold been reduced to say 2% as is the case under the 
Israeli system (see Yishai, 2010, p.151). Nevertheless, as Walsh pointed out, this is not peculiar 
to Fiji as other countries in the Pacific such as New Zealand also have a 5% threshold (see 
http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/). New Caledonia also has a 5% threshold but under a slightly different 
system (Fraenkel, 2006, p.71).    
political partiEs
Like the engineered electoral and political party systems in PNG and Samoa briefly outlined 
above, there are provisions under the 2013 constitution and the 2013 Political Parties Registration 
Decree and the 2014 Electoral Decree for political party strengthening and a stable parliament. 
Although candidates can still run as independents, the 5% threshold is so high that chances of 
securing a seat are higher under the collective votes of political parties. For instance Roshika Deo, 
one of the two independent candidates who contested in 2014, secured a total of 1,055 (0.2%) 
votes. As an independent candidate, she was a long way from the threshold. However, if she had 
contested say under the Fiji First banner, she would have secured a seat. Indeed, she polled more 
votes than 9 of the MPs duly elected under the collective votes of the FijiFirst Party. The point 
is that electoral and political party systems are politically engineered to compel candidates to 
run under political parties rather than as independents. Such a move will avoid the likelihood of 
parliamentary instability by the formation of independent factions (see Nanau 2010). 
Under the Political Parties (Registration, Conduct, Funding and Disclosures) Decree 2013, 
political parties are required to register with an indication of national support in the registration 
process. A group of people cannot be regarded as a political party and may be heavily penalised 
(a fine of $50,000 or five years imprisonment or both) unless they are registered in the Register of 
Political Parties. An application to register a political party must be made in writing from at least 
five applicants who are members of the proposed party. The names of the political party must be 
in English, a move to discourage ethnic based political parties, and applications must include the 
names of the office bearers and their voter identification numbers. In addition, the application 
to register a political party must be accompanied by the names, signatures, voter identification 
card numbers and addresses of 5000 members of the party making the application accompanied 
by a fee of $5005.00. These 5000 signatures should come from the 4 regions of Fiji as follows: 
(i) 2,000 members from the Central Division; (ii) 1,750 from the Western Division; (iii) 1,000 
members from the Northern Division; and (iv) 250 members from the Eastern Division (see 
GOF, 2013: 44). It is important to note here that this is basically a registration process and does 
not bind those affixing their signatures to that particular political party nor an indication of actual 
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support. The results in Table 1 and Figure 1 above clearly support this point. Despite the 5000 
signatures obtained by One Fiji and Fiji United Freedom Party (FUFP), they each got less than 
5000 votes in the General Election. 
In the 2014 elections, after going through the requirements of registering a party, a total of 7 
political parties and 2 independents contested the national General Election. These were: Fiji 
First, Fiji Labour Party (FLP), National Federation Party (NFP), People’s Democratic Party 
(PDP), Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA), One Fiji and Fiji United Freedom Party 
(FUFP). Two independent candidates Roshika Deo and Umesh Chand also contested.  These 
political parties fielded a total of 248 candidates vying for the 50 seats in parliament. Voters cast 
their votes in a designated polling station from more than 2000 polling stations throughout the 
country. Fourteen thousand (14,000) polling officials were engaged to manage the polling stations 
in the 2014 elections (Fiji One News, September, 2014).  Since the whole country constituted 
a single constituency the Constitution Boundaries Commission was disestablished. All those 
elected are representative of every citizen in Fiji. The principle of delegation and resemblance on 
the part of MPs therefore may not apply in the current system in Fiji.   
partiEs and rEgistErEd votErs
The actual final list of registered voters was not publically available prior to the Election Day but 
was later released after the elections. From the list, it is difficult to identify the registered voters 
disaggregated according ethnicity, age group, gender or other categories. Part of the reason for 
this lack of disaggregated data is the move away from ethnic based communal constituencies 
to a single constituency system. As Steve Ratuva explained, the use of a single constituency 
system is to “constitutionally and socially engineer people’s political behaviour away from 
ethnic mobilisation” (Ratuva, 2014).  
In the 2014 elections, a total of 524,712 voters were registered. From the total, 5,508 were 
registered as overseas voters. Moreover, out of that total number of registered voters, 100,960 
were youths in the age bracket of 18 to 25 years (“Fiji times Online”, 2014).  On the eve of the 
Election Day, an estimated picture of the total number of registered voters based on gender was 
revealed as depicted in Table 2.  
table 2 : Total number of registered voters by gender
  Males Females itaukei indo-Fijians others
Population 837,271 427,176 475,739 475,739 313,798 47,734  
(census 2007) (2007)    (37.6%) 
Registered Voters 524,712 300,353 224,358 N/A N/A N/A
(2014) (2014)
Source:  Fiji Times Online & Fiji Broadcasting Corporation and Fiji Election office, 2014.
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Reflecting on a single constituency and the desire of the regime to constitutionally engineer 
change away from ethnicity and region, voter statistics are only disaggregated in terms of gender. 
It is therefore quite difficult to assess how the voters from each region and ethnic group in Fiji 
voted in the 2014 general elections. We can only assess the old issue of ethnicity in terms of 
candidates and the winners in the elections to get some general insights into ethnic relations and 
representation.
rEFlEctions on thE 2014 ElEction rEsults
The various processes that Fiji went through before undertaking the first democratic elections 
after an eight year lapse were welcome. With so much at stake, the election was a positive turn 
towards representative democracy in Fiji. The credibility of the election results was established 
by the Multinational Observer Group (MOG) led by Australia, India, Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea which oversaw voting in polling stations and the counting of ballot papers. The leader 
of the MOG made a public statement on the 20th and 21st September and assured the global 
community that all went well and that the results of the elections were credible (Fiji Times, 
2014; Fiji Sun, 2014; FEO, 2014). This is not to obscure the fact that there were some protests 
by members of some political parties during the draw of candidates’ numbers and immediately 
after the announcement of the official results. The results of the Fiji 2014 General Election were 
outlined in Table 1. Figure 2 below shows the same election results shown in Table 1 and Figure 
1 above but disaggregated into gender and ethnicity. Figure 3 compares results based on ethnicity 
and gender.
Figure 2: Total number of candidates by gender and ethnicity
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Figure 3: 2014 disaggregated election results as per ethnicity and gender 
One key observation from the election results is the triumph of female candidates, partly as a 
consequence of the new electoral system. The 2014 elections have yielded more female MPs 
into the National Parliament of Fiji than in any other time in its independent history. Females 
comprised 17.7% of the registered candidates who contested the elections and they ultimately 
secured 16% of the seats. Forty three of the women candidates ran under political party banners 
while one contested as an independent. The female MPs elected into parliament in 2014 include 
Ro Teimumu Kepa, Vane Seruvakula, Mere Samisoni, Tupou Draunidalo, Rosie Sofia Akbar, 
Veena Bhatnagar, Mereseini Vuniwaqa and Lorna Eden. It should be pointed out that Jiko Luveni 
was also elected but resigned to take up the Speakers’ position, the first female speaker in the 
history of Fiji. In comparison only 6% of the 338 candidates in 2006 elections were women. In 
that election 8 seats (11%) were secured by women candidates in the 71 seat parliament (see 
Chattier, 2014). For Fiji and the Pacific, this is an indication of the slow progress towards gender 
equality in political leadership. 
Secondly, it is important to note the extraordinary support by voters especially for the leaders of 
the two prominent political parties; FijiFirst’s Frank Bainimarama and SODELPA’s Ro Teimumu 
Kepa. These two party leaders secured 69.9% and 34.9% respectively for their political parties. 
Bainimarama in particular was so popular among Fijian voters that the other 31 FijiFirst MPs 
only contributed 30.1% of the votes for FijiFirst. Ro Teimumu also had very strong support as 
she captured 34.9% of the SODELPA votes by herself while her other 13 MPs collected 65.1% 
of the party votes. This support for party leaders could be attributed to many factors, including 
position and status in society and the party’s campaign strategy. 
Ro Teimumu’s support could be explained by her position as a respected traditional Fijian 
leader who obviously had the support of the Itaukei voters nationwide. Her popularity could 
also be attributed to her bold and vocal stance against the Bainimarama regime prior to the 2014 
general elections. Frank Bainimarama’s support was due in part to the campaign strategy used 
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by FijiFirst which focussed mainly on the party leader. Moreover, since he seized power from 
the Laisenia Qarase led government, his interim government focussed on financing tangible 
infrastructure developments that benefitted a larger cross section of the community. Most crucial 
was his government’s focus in the election on bread and butter issues plus security concerns that 
cut across ethnicity, gender and generational lines. Such developments were projected positively 
by the media, some of which were controlled by the interim government. 
Third, Figure 2 suggests that FijiFirst encouraged the representation of different ethnicities in 
its candidate composition. As a very new political party formed by a government that preached 
equality and equal representation of all ethnicities in Fiji, this was an important outcome. 
Significant inroads were made by the party to ensure that the system catered for the representation 
of Itaukei, Indo-Fijian and other interest groups in society.  There was an indication of a more 
balanced representation of different ethnic groups by the FijiFirst candidates and MPs that 
actually secured seats. On the other hand, SODELPA maintained a strong emphasis on iTaukei 
candidates. To an extent NFP and FLP also held on to ethnic politics, a hangover from their past. 
Even newly established parties like PDP, One Fiji and FUFP were heavily weighted towards 
ethnic affiliations. The pie charts below compare the distribution of candidates running under the 
six political parties that contested the 2014 elections together with FijiFirst. 
Figure 4: Ethnic composition of SODELPA and NFP candidates
Figure 5: Ethnic composition of Fiji Labour and PDP candidates 
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Figure 6: Ethnic composition of FUFP and One Fiji candidates
Figure 7: Ethnic composition of FijiFirst Candidates 
For FijiFirst, SODELPA and NFP, there was greater recognition of gender equality in political 
party leadership, candidate line up and the number of elected candidates. As indicated earlier, 
these are positive developments under the 2013 constitution and a clearer evaluation of this 
progress will become apparent after the 2018 general election. A concern may emerge if in the 
future, the current ‘two-party system’ further polarises the society representing the two dominant 
ethnicities. If that happens, the smaller parties would become king makers and a new set of 
political issues for the country would emerge.  
Fourth and closely related to the observation above is the question of whether or not the election 
results actually give us a good indication of the noble intentions of this constitutionally engineered 
political party and electoral system. As mentioned earlier, the Bainimarama regime since 2006 
had been preaching the need to move away from ethnic and class based political parties and 
politicking towards a more multi-ethnic and peaceful coexistence. They have progressed into this 
area by promoting and addressing: (i) bread and butter issues; (ii) tangible products/infrastructure 
coupled with further promises under a democratic setting (be with the devil you know approach); 
and, (iii) physical security from harm. This was especially critical for Indo-Fijian voters and 
minority groups (see Narsey, 19 April 2014). Narsey later re-iterated that the fear by Indo-Fijians 
about who has more control over the military (‘fear factor’) may explain their vote for the Fiji 
First Party (Narsey, 21 September, 2014). Again, such a position will only be verified after a 
second election under the current constitution in 2018.This is because Fijian voters would have 
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time to assess the performance of the FijiFirst government that was elected and compare that 
with the same unelected government that ran the country between 2006 and 2014.  
Finally, the landslide victory of the FijiFirst party and its subsequent control of 66% of the seats 
may signal four years of parliamentary stability. The ruling government can easily pass laws 
because of the majority support in Parliament. However, with the new democratic arrangement 
and associated processes and the need to debate with the opposition, development decisions may 
be slower than when the current PM was ruling with an unelected government. Sections 63 and 
65 of the 2013 Constitution provide further safeguards for political stability. In the event that an 
MP misses out on two meetings without the Speaker’s consent, that MP automatically loses his/
her seat in parliament. Similar to the OLIPPAC law in PNG and those adopted in Samoa, the 
constitution also provides for an early dissolution of Parliament. The important provisions that 
would ensure stability are those prohibiting the introduction of votes of no confidence against the 
government. The leader of opposition is not allowed to move a motion of no confidence against 
the Prime Minister until 18 months after the formation of government and within 6 months 
before the end of the parliamentary term of four years. A sitting MP is also not allowed to switch 
allegiance to another political party under the current system as s/he automatically loses the seat 
when switching allegiance. This would suggest that parliamentary stability is assured for the next 
four years. 
FuturE outlook
Without being too presumptuous about the future, it is still possible to anticipate possible 
scenarios. The fundamental question that will continue to be of interest to Fiji’s political 
observers is whether ethnic politics suppressed through electoral engineering will re-emerge in 
future elections. Constitutional and political party engineering in the country to an extent had 
produced an election outcome that drastically shifted ethnic and regional politics. At least on 
the surface and based on the 2014 election results, the system promoted inclusive politics where 
ethnicity, regional and gender equality were advanced. Having said that, it is important to note 
some perturbing features of the 2014 election campaigns such as distinct positions taken by 
political parties on sensitive national issues along ethnic and identity lines. The polarization of 
Fiji along ethnic and identity lines was obvious in the lead up to the 2014 elections especially 
in the social media. Nevertheless, if the current political trends continue uninterrupted into the 
future, the benefits for the country are abundant. Given the background of the political system 
now in place in Fiji, the type of constitutional engineering that took place and general discussions 
on the experiences with political parties and electoral systems in the Pacific more generally, 
two scenarios are possible. One possibility is the further strengthening of a two party system 
generated by the 2014 election results. Second is the possible loss of support for one or two 
parties as a consequence of the dwindling of support for political party leaders and manifestos.  I 
discuss these two prospects separately.
The first possibility is for the current trend of a two party system produced by the recent election 
to be sustained into the future. However, two party systems do not normally emerge from 
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proportional representation systems (such as Fiji’s) in which minority groups and interests are 
usually represented. In a normal representative democracy, two party systems usually emerge 
in majoritarian systems such as the First Past the Post (FPTP) which often discourage voters 
from wasting their votes on third and smaller parties. When voters do switch allegiance, they are 
usually inclined to switch to one of the more successful parties. This is what Duverger (1966) 
called the ‘mechanical effect’ of plurality systems where bigger parties have disproportionate 
shares of seats than votes and that subsequently places  small political parties at a disadvantage. 
In PICs like PNG, Solomon Islands and others that have plurality electoral systems, this so 
called ‘mechanical effect’ never materialized because of the fluidity of political party systems 
explained earlier.  Surprisingly, Fiji’s proportional representation system, at least in the 2014 
elections, produced a two-party system that if nurtured with sufficient time and right information 
may actually lead to voters assessing the relative strength of political parties. If that continues, the 
‘psychological effect’ as Duverger (1966) calls it, would influence voters to avoid wasting their 
votes on smaller parties and candidates. If that happens, after several elections under the current 
electoral system, the possibility of a two party system evolving – one conservative (indigenous 
rights) and the other moderately liberal (change/human rights) –is conceivable.  
The second scenario would be the dissipation of the emerging two-party system and a reduction 
in the approval levels accorded to the two political parties and their leaders, giving way to a 
multiparty system. If the party leaders are not popular enough the likelihood of voters going 
back to regional and ethnic voting is possible. They would gravitate towards smaller parties 
or even independent candidates that resemble their peculiar needs and aspirations. Many more 
small parties would emerge with no dominant ones, in contrast to the 2014 elections. If that 
happens coalitions of sorts comprising smaller political parties may become critical king makers. 
This would be a messy scenario that would give way to parliamentary instability. Anthony 
Downs (1957) explained that in such situations rational voters will cast ballots for parties or 
candidates who are not their first preferences in order to maximize the impact of their votes. It 
may be important to point out that the restriction of Members of Parliament switching allegiance 
mentioned above is only for individual MPs. A situation may arise if an entire political party 
decided to shift allegiance in a government coalition setting. Like any other constitutionally 
engineered political and electoral party system in the Pacific, there may be loopholes that MPs 
could exploit when the need arises or when poor leadership cannot be changed through the 
normal established and legitimate processes. 
conclusion
Fiji and Fiji citizens have gone through a lot of change since the 1970 flag independence from 
Britain. The political structures, laws and institutions adopted then were colonial hangovers. 
In its first seventeen years of independence, stability was experienced under such structures. 
However in 1987, the first coups rocked the nation followed by subsequent coups in 2000 and 
2006. Ordinary Fiji citizens have observed and lived through these events and the changes and 
destruction they brought with them. Many left because of frustration and uncertainty of the future 
but many more remained because Fiji is home and cannot be replaced by another. Still others 
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have limited ability to move. The 2006 coup and the various decrees introduced by the military 
regime that followed were a beacon of hope for many citizens. The democratic world, though, 
including some neighbouring countries of the Pacific turned their backs on Fiji. The regime 
persisted under an unfriendly regional and international environment promising to build a ‘Fiji 
for all Fijians’ and to ‘end all coups’. The 2013 constitution is a culmination of the efforts by the 
regime and constitutional committees tasked to determine the political future of Fiji. The Yash 
Ghai Commission earlier tasked to draft the constitution consulted widely and compiled a draft 
that was rejected by the regime although most of its suggestions found their way into the 2013 
constitution. The constitution and decrees configured certain aspects of politics in the country, 
including the electoral system.   
One such aspect of politics is the notion of representative democracy. The 2013 constitution 
engineered democracy to mean that MPs are elected through a proportional representation 
system where all MPs represent all citizens since the whole country is a single constituency. 
Representation under the current system is such that MPs do not directly connect to people from 
a specific geographic locality or section of society.  Once elected, these MPs and their political 
parties are entrusted and mandated by the whole country to represent them. Whether people 
from one region, ethnic group or gender dominate parliament is a non-issue as political parties 
and the elected MPs have a mandate from the higher number of voters that voted them in. For 
example in the first house under the 2013 constitution, two relatives from the same village who 
contested under SODELPA and FijiFirst respectively each secured seats and one is now serving 
as a minister and the other an opposition MP. Who represents who in such a situation? Other 
matters regulated in the current system are political party registration and membership, and the 
electoral process. Once an MP is in parliament, s/he is bound to the political party and is expected 
to attend all parliamentary sittings. At the same time, MPs who switch political party allegiance 
automatically lose their seats, similar to what happens in Samoa and PNG under their respective 
electoral systems. In the said countries, what followed were tendencies for dictatorial leadership 
where political parties and leaders remain in office for extended periods of time. In the case 
of Samoa, it produced what some people call a one party state because of the rule by a single 
political party for more than 30 years. With the restraints in place, Fiji may also go down that 
route where the current government remains in power for a long time. 
Fiji’s experience under the current constitution and engineered electoral system appears to 
discourage and side-line independent candidates. It actually forces would-be independent 
candidates to join political parties because of the very high threshold. It also shows that the 
popularity of political parties is determined by the popularity of a party leader as an individual 
and not necessarily on the policies of the political party. An effective strategy used in the 2014 
elections was of focussing on the positive qualities and popularity of the party leaders. The 
more votes the party leader got, the more members of the party had the chance to secure seats in 
parliament. More importantly parties that focus on basic needs and bread and butter issues attract 
voters from a broad cross section of society. Basic needs became the primary consideration while 
other concerns like human rights and other higher needs were of secondary importance, at least 
to the ordinary voters. 
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Fiji has reverted once more to a parliamentary democracy following the 2014 General Elections. 
FijiFirst was chosen by a majority of eligible voters as the most favoured political party and 
with the most popular leader. With infrastructure development and in the vision of ‘Fiji for all 
Fijians’, there is optimism for strengthening the goal of multi ethnic and peaceful co-existence. 
It would be interesting to see the outcomes of four years of parliamentary democracy and debates 
under the 2013 constitution.  The second election under the 2013 constitution in 2018 may give 
us a clearer indication of whether people have really moved away from ethnic politics, in line 
with the focus and intent of the 2013 constitution. 
EndnotEs:
1  This single constituency arrangement is similar to the Israeli system (see Yishai, 2010)
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